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CONSTITUTIONAL STUMBLING BLOCKS TO
LEGISLATIVE TORT REFORM
KENNETH VINSON*

Recent attempts by state legislators to reform the tort system
have frequently been struck down by the courts on constitutional
grounds. In this light, the author reviews the hostile judicial reactions to tort reform from the turn-of-the-century challenges to
workers' compensation schemes through present day reform efforts. In the discussion of modern day efforts, the author focuses
on attempts by the FloridaLegislature to deal with the insurance
crisis and then examines the FloridaSupreme Court's use of state
constitutional provisions to block these efforts. The author concludes that the judiciary should allow the legislature and the voters a freer hand in creating new tort law.

T

HE CURRENT debate over legislative tort reform-and its
constitutionality-began almost a century ago when first, employers' liability bills, and later, workers' compensation bills, were
offered in response to the turn-of-the-century tort crisis in the
workplace. As the torts debate, then and now, has revealed to all
the world, the stuff of torts is principally politics.' When judge and
jury in accident cases choose damage-suit winners, they necessarily
exercise discretionary governmental power.2 Both lawyers and
nonlawyers, moreover, struggle to influence this exercise of governmental power by which the costs of accidents are allocated between plaintiffs and defendants.3 Given the bar's long love affair
*

Professor of Law, Florida State University. LL.B., 1959, University of Texas; LL.M.,

1964, Yale University.
1. See Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE L.J. 698 (1986); Green, Tort Law Public
Law in Disguise (pts. 1 & 2), 38 Tsx. L. REV. 1, 257 (1959-60). For evidence that torts and
too much politics may occasionally make for a scandal, see reports about controversy surrounding the Texas Supreme Court over alleged out-of-court contacts between justices and
plaintiffs' lawyers with pending personal injury cases in Case, Blind Justice, TExas
MONTHLY, May 1987, at 137, and Burka, Heads, We Win, Tails, You Lose, id. at 138. Texas
plaintiffs' lawyers have been so successful in recent years in efforts to elect pro-plaintiff
justices that the state high court has rewritten tort law to shift Texas' traditional pro-defendant stance to a decidedly pro-plaintiff stance; in the process, the reformist justices have
gotten themselves embroiled in an investigation by a state legislative committee examining
charges that the justices have been too cozy with certain members of the plaintiffs' bar.
2. Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28 COLUM. L. REv. 1014, 1015-16
(1928).
3. See infra note 34; see also infra note 21 (report of President Reagan's speech at the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce Headquarters to 300 business-leader representatives of the
American Tort Reform Organization; during the speech picketers from the Ralph Nader-
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with personal injury practice,4 it is easy to understand the displeasure with which judges, bred like their practitioner colleagues to
the common law, must view legislative intrusion into the litigation
5
process of tort law.
founded Public Citizen Organization protested outside against the President's anti-plaintiff
reform preferences); R. KEETON

& J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM;

A BLUEPRINT FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE 227 (1965) (key actor in political arena
is the personal injury bar); Cargill, Tort "Reforms" Hurt Us All, LAW, MEDICINE AND
HEALTH CARE, Vol. 13, No. 3, June, 1985; Ison, The Politics of Reform in Personal Injury
Compensation, 27 U. TORONTO L.J. 385 (1977) (focusing on the personal injury bar and the

private insurance industry, as well as on unions and organizations of the disabled, and concluding that in the long run the legal profession will damage its credibility by attempting to
preserve a tort system "that is so utterly indefensible .... ") Id. at 402); Parker, Facile
Debate, TRIAL, May, 1986, at 17 (ATLA's director of public affairs charges the Reagan Administration with overlooking the responsibility of the insurance industry for the insurance
crisis); Perlman, All Pain and Suffering is Not Equal, TRIAL, June, 1986, at 5 (president of
ATLA opposes legislative capping of jury awards:
"I don't care how much clout the special interests have; might is still not right.
This one trial lawyer, and the 65,000 others, will fight to the end to keep the
American courthouse open, to keep the power in the jury box, and to give the
victims of society the right to seek full and fair compensation ....
Id.; Perlman, Unmasking the Fox, TRIAL, April, 1986, at 5 (ATLA president says the fox in
the henhouse is the insurance industry); Rutigliano, Insurance Crisis for Doctors?, TRIAL,
May, 1986, at 29 (trial lawyer refutes American Medical Association campaign for malpractice reform); Stewart, The "Tort Reform" Hoax,

TRIAL,

July, 1986, at 89 (former president

of Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers says insurance industry, not tort system, the culprit);
Auto Insurance: How It Works, CONSUMER REP., Sept., 1984, at 546 (blames trial lawyers for
blocking the advance of no-fault auto insurance); Blankenship, Study Shows Million Dollar
Awards Hard to Collect, Fla. Bar News, June 15, 1986, at 5, col. 1 (studies released by
Florida trial judges-while state legislators were debating damage-suit caps-downgrading
financial impact of large verdicts); McHugh, Trial Lawyers Tell Tales, Circle Wagons
Against Tort Reform, Chi. Daily L.B., Vol. 132, Feb. 18, 1986, at 1, col. 2; Trial Lawyers'
Legislative Fights with Physicians Could Prove Expensive, L.A. Daily J., Dec. 26, 1985, at
1, col. 6; McHugh, Bar Mobilizing to Meet Tort System Challenge, Chi. Daily L.B., Vol.
131, Nov. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 5; Couric, Whatever Happened to No-Fault?, Nat'l L.J., Nov.
18, 1985, at 1, col. 3; Malcomb, Doctors Prepare Attack on Suits for Malpractice, N.Y.
Times, Feb. 15, 1985, at Al, col. 2.
4. Silas, Bitter Medicine, A.B.A. J., April, 1986, at 20 (ABA rejects AMA's call for medical malpractice reforms, relying on extensive report of special ABA Committee on Medical
Professional Liability headed by Dean Talbot "Sandy" D'Alemberte of the Florida State
University College of Law). For the view that the bar's long love affair has stifled needed
reform and has "profoundly disturbing implications," see Daniel P. Moynihan's forward to
J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY; No-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
at xii (1975); likewise, see M. MAYER, THE LAWYERS at 263 (1966), for the charge that

"money in personal injury lawsuits has corrupted two [law and medicine] professions."
5. Of course, some judges think their fellow judges have done too much (common law)
reforming on their own. See, e.g., Hutchinson, Beyond No-Fault, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 755, 756
n.6 (1985) (on socialism).
To which side of the current tort reform debate does a good liberal belong? Is it in opposition, along with Ralph Nader and the personal injury bar, to legislation limiting tort recovery? Surely, this pro-plaintiff position is the traditional place for the liberal (the liberal
judiciary, after all, according to the Reagan Administration, is the cause of the movement in
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When legal associations such as the American Bar Association
criticize tort reform proposals, or when judges rule statutes unconstitutional that displace or amend common law torts, it is clear
that when looking for motivations some weight must be given to
the legal community's self-interest, conscious or otherwise, in perpetuating a tort system that feeds so many lawyers.6 This is not to
say lawyers and judges can or should remain unaffected by their
politics or their bread-and-butter. The problem is how does the
observer know, when the legal community labels tort reform an unpatriotic undermining of our constitutional and adversarial way of
life, how much to discount for professional self-interest. In the author's review of the hostile judicial reactions to tort reform in Florida, he assumes that despite judicial pledges to the rule of neutral
principles, judicial preference for maintaining traditional tort law
influences to some extent decisions invalidating reform statutes,
and that in reviewing objections to tort reform, the lawyerly custom is to play the partisan in passionate spades.
In this Article, the author looks at a sampling of the successful
twentieth-century constitutional attacks on tort reform legislation,
and concludes that despite the occasional use of the power of judicial review to shield common law torts, the view expressed in Professor Sugarman's recent article Doing Away with Tort Law is
correct:
I have long been unimpressed with the claim that states cannot
simply repeal tort law for personal injury without thereby deprivrecent decades of tort law away from fault and toward a social insurance system-see infra
note 21). On the other hand, for those liberals who see the present tort system as irretrievably flawed and see neither insurance companies nor the personal injury bar as white
knights, then perhaps the reform bandwagon is the place to ride, hoping that reform will
one day go beyond the present bandaid stage toward establishing compensation systems
that will more frequently put insurance dollars into accident victims' pockets, at less cost to
the public.
6. For surprising reports on the large percentage of the bar's collective income attributable to legal fees from personal injury litigation, see J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND
THE REMEDY OF No-FAULT INSURANCE 50-51 (1971). U.S. Senator Daniel P. Moynihan, when
he wrote as a professor about the rapacious effect of lucrative personal injury litigation on
lawyers sounded a dark note indeed: "If the bar cannot do anything but proceed with the
squalid concerns that have characterized its dealing with this issue . . . then the bar is
sicker than anyone knows .... " Moynihan, Changes for Automobile Claims, U. ILL. L.F.
361, 369 (1967). The Florida Supreme Court suggests that legislative restrictions on the contingent fees of plaintiffs' lawyers would be unconstitutional. In re The Florida Bar, 349 So.
2d 630 (Fla. 1977). Meanwhile, in Texas, plaintiffs' lawyers recently gave sufficient funds to
assure election of anti-tort reform judges to that state's high court. Paonita, Voters in 3
States Reject Chief Justices, Nat'l L. J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 3, col. 1.
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ing people of due process rights. Such thinking reflects a longpast era of judicial intrusion into legislative policymaking in the
area of economics and social welfare on substantive due process
7
grounds.
Before tracing recent Florida evidence of judicial discomfort with
legislative tort reform, the author looks back to the early days of
this century when another crisis, this time caused by a tort system
overly keen on accepting employer defenses to workers' negligence
suits, led to a constitutional struggle over no-fault compensation
acts. From that battle over the legitimacy of workers' compensation came many of the reform ideas as well as many of the constitutional objections which are surfacing in connection with the current tort crisis. As was the case over seventy years ago with
compensation for workplace accident victims, it is probable that
future reforms, no matter how radical, are likely to stand up in the
long run to even a relatively aggressive defender of traditional torts
such as the Florida Supreme Court. Meanwhile, with legislatures
annually cranking out tentative answers to our latter-day crisis in
torts, 8 it is of interest to review the long struggle between those
who would legislate new tort law and those members of the bar in
loyal opposition.
Since the current tort reform movement began in the late 1960s,
the Florida Supreme Court has been especially active in using the
power of judicial review to slow down, although not halt, legislative
attempts to modify tort law.' The court has struck down, under
one theory or another: the property damage section of the Florida
7. Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALH?. L. REv. 555, 617 n.270 (1985). For a
general survey of constitutional litigation concerning early workers' compensation statutes
and more recent no-fault legislation, see J. O'Connell, supra note 4, at 204-45.
8. Infra note 140. That there is a crisis in insurance coverage attributable in part to the
expansion of tort liability is evidenced by data collected in Fort, Granger, Polston & Wilkes,
Florida'sTort Reform: Response to a Persistent Problem, 14 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 505, 533-544
(1986) [hereinafter Fort]. For a description of recent efforts of lawyer groups to persuade
Florida's legislature that the insurance industry has created a false crisis, see id. at 536
n.166.
9. In this Article, the author, by reviewing the Florida Supreme Court's recent acceptance of claims of state constitution-based restraints on remedial tort legislation, offers some
perspective on how those constitutional restraints may apply to the current rash of statutory changes. Of course, a complete review of such claims, not offered here, would include
the numerous cases in which Florida courts have rejected constitutional attacks. See, e.g.,
Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Von Stetina, 474 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1985) (periodic
payments in medical malpractice cases upheld); Pinillos v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp. Corp.,
403 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 1981) (collateral source rule upheld). See generally Fort, supra note 8.
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Automobile Reparations Reform [No-Fault] Act;10 the statute of
repose barring after twelve years actions against engineers, architects, and contractors arising from real estate construction; 1 the
Medical Mediation Act establishing pretrial mediation for medical
malpractice claims; 2 the statute of repose barring products liability actions twelve years after date of sale;' 3 and, in 1984, a citizens'
effort to amend the Florida Constitution by public referendum to
limit non-economic damages to $100,000 and to abolish joint and
several liability."'
If the history of constitutional challenges to tort reform is a reliable guide, the Florida Supreme Court will continue to dodge an
all-out war with the state legislature over its tort reform efforts.
The court, however, may insist in making its presence known by
invalidating selected reform measures. Tort reform, after all, is too
pressing a topic in these times of crisis for the judiciary, despite
their devotion to their common law off-spring, to fire more than a
few pot shots at the products of legislative tinkering. The judiciary, much to the sorrow of plaintiffs' lawyers everywhere, has been
reduced, both early and late in this century, to a slow retreat
before the legislative advance.
10. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973) (striking down FLA. STAT. § 627.738 (1971)).
As for the remainder of Florida's automobile no-fault act, a divided court has with one

minor exception sustained the constitutionality of the original act and amendments. See
Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974) (holding that Florida's Automobile
Reparations Reform Act did not violate the state constitution's open courts clause.) See also
Chapman v. Dillon, 415 So. 2d 12, 19 (Fla. 1982) (three of six sitting justices in Chapman
said the no-fault act in important particulars bordered on the "outer limits of constitutional" tolerance; two of the justices said the elimination of pain and suffering damages for
nonpermanent injuries, delineated in FLA. STAT. § 627.737(2) (1979), was unconstitutional
under Kluger). For more on Chapman, see Note, Insurance:Does Florida'sNo-Fault Law
Comply With the Constitutional Right of Access to the Courts?, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 194
(1983); compare Dimond v. District of Columbia, 618 F. Supp. 519 (D.D.C. 1984) ($5,000
threshold for noneconomic losses unconstitutional). For the opinion of two Florida lawyerlegislators that their no-fault automobile bill "involves the same policy considerations as
workmans' compensation legislation [and should therefore be deemed constitutional]," see
Gillespie & MacKay, Florida'sNo-Fault Insurance Law, 45 FLA. B.J. 400, 402 (1971).
11.

Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979) (statute of repose in FLA.
§ 95.11(3)(c) (1975) violates open courts clause).
12. Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231, 238 (Fla. 1980) (FLA. STAT. § 768.44 (1979) violates
due process clauses of United States and Florida Constitutions).
13. Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980), rev'd, Pullum v. Cincinnati, Inc., 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985) (approving the result only of the Battilla decision
striking down FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (1975)).
14. Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1984).
STAT.
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THE DEBATE OVER TORT REFORM

The Association of Trial Lawyers of America (ATLA) continues
to protect the interests of accident victims, as ATLA sees those
interests, by struggling to contain the current flood of tort reforms.
Robert Habush, promising to fight to near-death to preserve for
the bloodied and maimed the right to a common law jury, became
ATLA president in 1986 just in time to kick off ATLA's newlyformed Constitutional Challenge Committee. These challengers are
sifting through fifty state constitutions for ammunition to support
future court attacks on tort reform statutes. 15 Challenge Committee Chairman Jerry Palmer reports, "We've identified and prioritized the harmful state statutes... and we have action plans from
[trial bar] leaders in those states."16
President Habush also is promoting a second ATLA-sponsored
entity devoted to protecting damage suit plaintiffs from the "ill
wind" of the insurance crisis, the new Civil Justice Foundation.
Habush says this foundation's information-gathering efforts are a
monument to the good citizenship of trial lawyers and demonstrates the trial bar's "commitment to principle is for the greater
good of the whole.' 7 The logo for the Civil Justice Foundation
symbolizes the paternalistic attitude that personal injury lawyers
affect concerning their relationship to accident victims. The foundation's logo is, as ATLA puts it, "a tree, fruitful and flourishing,
offering shelter and a refreshing gathering place for those who
need to come together."1 8
ATLA has good reason to fear the waves of tort reform in this
and the previous decade. Personal injury lawyers may one day, it
appears, join the whooping crane in near-extinction. While most of
the reform action today involves minor alterations of the tort sys15. ConstitutionalChallenges of Tort Reform Gear Up, ATLA Advocate, Vol. 12, No. 7,
Oct., 1986, at 1, col. 2. The Constitutional Challenge Committee advises that state constitutions are a riper source of challenge material than the federal constitution, presumably because the United States Supreme Court has for half a century opted out of the business of
reviewing economic legislation for substantive due process defects. Id.
16. Id. at 1, col. 1. Palmer adds that ATLA is hiring a constitutional law professor to
"consult in state constitutional law." Apparently, ATLA hopes that this will help prove in
court that high insurance rates are the result of faulty insurance practices and not of the
fault system, and that statutory caps placed on traditional tort damages are unconstitutional. Id.
17. Habush, The Good Side of The Ill Wind, TRIAL, Nov., 1986, at 5.
18. Id. The common law of torts, no matter what one thinks of current reform proposals,
has in the past served fairly well in regulating the distribution of accident losses. Should
tort law as we know it eventually expire, however, it deserves in burial a bouquet better
than an overripe tree parked in front of an ATLA organzation.
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tern, a continuing crisis atmosphere will one day awaken legislators
to the possibility, only mentioned in whispers now, of replacing
large portions of the tort system with alternative compensation
schemes modeled along the lines of workers' compensation, nofault auto insurance, or perhaps tied to some form of social
insurance.
As the debate in Florida and around the nation over tort reform
waxes ever hotter, debaters are no longer confining themselves to
courtrooms and legal periodicals. Today, insurance and industry
groups, trial lawyers, editorial writers, consumer organizations, and
politicians fill newspapers and magazines with charges and
counter-charges over whether there is really a litigation explosion
or a liability insurance crisis, and whether it is the lawyers, the
doctors, the insurers, or the tort system itself which is the cause of
it all. 9 Even the Reagan Administration, speaking through a special task force,2 0 and the President himself,2" has relaxed its preference for federalism long enough to ask Congress to consider national reforms limiting tort liability (especially strict liability) in a
' 22
civil justice system which has begun "to go terribly wrong.
Talk of more radical change is increasing. Several of the legal
scholars writing in a recent torts symposium in the California Law
Review23 conclude that modern tort law is too bankrupt for the
band-aid reforms currently in vogue among state lawmakers. Such
measures as limiting joint and several liability, modifying the collateral source rule, capping pain and suffering damages and attor19. The print media's coverage of, and participation in, the nation-wide tort debate during the first half of 1986 included these sample items: Church, Sorry, Your Policy is Canceled, TIME, March 24, 1986, at 16; Lacayo, The Malpractice Blues, TmE,Feb. 24, 1986, at
60; Kogan, Tort Crisis: Disorder ...,Americans for Legal Reform, Vol. 6, No. 3, Spring,
1986, at 10, col. 1; Kilpatrick, Facts Prove Slippery in Insurance-Crisis Debate, Rocky
Mountain News, June 11, 1986, at 69, col. 1; Hold Down Awards to Ease this Crisis, USA
Today, June 6, 1986, at 12A, col. 1; Satter, The Damage-Award Lottery, San Francisco
Chron., May 25, 1986, (This World), at 20, col. 2; Reform Time, Dallas Morning News, May
3, 1986, at 30A, col. 1; Torts Control, Wall St. J., Feb. 4, 1986, at 30, col. 1.
20. Report of the Tort Policy Working Group on the Causes, Extent and Policy Implications of the Current Crisis in Insurance Availability and Affordability, U.S. Gov't Printing Office, Feb., 1986. For a report on the U.S. Justice Department's publicity campaign
supporting Sen. Bob Kasten's (R., Wis.) recent bill, S. 100, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985),
aimed at reducing current products liability, see Justice's Tort Bill Marked by Ambiquity,
Legal Times, May 19, 1986, at 2, col. 3.
21. Reagan Asks for Limits on Lawsuits, Tacoma News Tribune, May 31, 1986, at A3,
col. 1.
22. Id.
23. Symposium: Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
548 (1985).
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neys' fees, and reducing the time within which damage claims may
be filed in court are thought inadequate to deal with the real problem. More radical proposals by symposium contributors include
scrapping tort law in favor of no-fault compensation programs financed either through first-party insurance, or through taxes on
risk-producing enterprises or on the general public.2 '
One of the contributors to the California symposium, Professor
Jeffrey O'Connell,2 5 the co-father of no-fault auto insurance with
Federal District Judge Robert Keeton, 26 has for two decades constantly reminded lawmakers that too many accident victims get either too little or nothing out of a tort system that wastes too many
liability insurance dollars on mindless litigation." Another symposium contributor, Professor David Owen, one of the revisers of that
symbol of torts orthodoxy, the Prosser Hornbook, 2 surprisingly revealed that even he no longer believes in a tort approach.2
In the Berkeley symposium's lead article, Doing Away with Tort
Law,3 0 Professor Sugarman raises the question of the constitutionality of a wholesale abolition of tort law." Sugarman aligns himself
with former Harvard Dean Erwin N. Griswold in the belief that,
consistent with federal constitutional law, Congress could abolish
24. See Schwartz, Forward: Tort Scholarship, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 548, 551-54 (1985); see
also Pedrick, Does Tort Law Have a Future?, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 782, 788 (1978) (Professor
Pedrick predicts that by the year 2050, social insurance will largely have supplanted tort
law's role in compensating accident victims).
25. O'Connell, A "Neo No-Fault" Contract In Lieu of Tort: Preaccident Guaranteesof
Postaccident Settlement Offers, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 898 (1985).
26. R. KEETON & J. O'CONNFLL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM; A BLUEPRINT
FOR REFORMING AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE (1965).
27. See generally J. O'CONNELL & B. KELLY, THE BLAME GAME (1987); J. O'CONNELL, THE
LAWSUIT LOTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN (1979); J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY:
NO-FAULT INSURANCE FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (1975); J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON,
TORT LAW, No-FAULT AND BEYOND: TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTS
AND AILMENTS IN MODERN SOCIETY (1975); J. O'CONNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE
REMEDY OF No-FAULT INSURANCE (1971). At the January 1987 meeting in Los Angeles of the

American Association of Law Schools, O'Connell told a roomful of law teachers assembled at
a January 3rd workshop on tort reform that the tort system is a "disaster," and that no
reform will solve the system's inadequacies unless two things happen: the costly, irrelevant
search for fault is ended, and damages for pain and suffering abolished so as to free up
funds to permit some measure of compensation for a broader range of accident victims.
28. W, KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 722 (5th ed. 1984).
29. Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 665 (1985). For
a contrary view that the traditional tort system is alive and well, see Hawkins, Retaining
Traditional Tort Liability in the Nonmedical Professions, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 33, 43-44
(1981).
30. 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555 (1985).
31. Id. at 617 n.270.
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our much-beleaguered state-run tort system.32 Sugarman confesses
inability, however, to confidently predict how individual state
courts, keying on state constitutions, might respond to radical legislative responses to the torts predicament.

II.

THE FIRST TORT CRISIS

Turn-of-the-century employers inadvertently set the stage for
the revolutionary compensation system that today covers workplace accidents. Before workers' compensation, employers defending negligence suits of injured employees were overly successful in
persuading judges of the merits of the common law defenses of
contributory negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow servant
doctrine. Workers rarely won negligence awards, and the injustice
of an industrial system which left its victims bloody and in poverty
led to the first tort crisis. Within a short time, tort law in the
workplace was abolished and replaced by universal workers' compensation schemes.3 3 These early legislative no-fault schemes presaged the more general retreat underway today from the nineteenth-century focus on fault. Since World War II, the shift
through both judicial and legislative lawmaking toward stricter
forms of tort liability has accelerated. This trend toward downplaying the elusive search for culpability and toward promoting a
more general shift of accident losses to the enterprise was perhaps
inevitable once workers' compensation proved the answer for our
largest class of accident victims. Similarly, the growth of liability
insurance, by providing funds for broader coverage, accelerated the
loss-shifting.
Professor Jeremiah Smith, commenting at a time when workers'
compensation bills were gathering majority votes in state legislatures, foresaw that tort law would never be the same. 4 He foretold
how trial judges might, even under the guise of a fault system, manipulate burdens of proof and the res ipsa locquitur doctrine so as
to facilitate compensating injured plaintiffs. Smith also foresaw the
fate of contributory negligence, "a decadent doctrine, which will
ultimately disappear from the law."'3 5 And finally, Smith looked
ahead to the tensions which would exist in a legal world where no32. Id.
33. See Rhodes, The Inception of Workmen's Compensation in the United States, 11
ME. L. REV. 35 (1917).
34. Smith, Sequel to Workmen's Compensation Acts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 235, 344 (191314).
35. Id. at 243.
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fault compensation systems stand alongside a common law fault
system: "In the end, one or the other of the two conflicting theories
is likely to prevail." 3 6
A.

Anti-Reform Judicial Review in The Employers' Liability
Cases

The tension between the common law negligence system and legislative reform preceded even the workers' compensation movement. This tension arose toward the end of the last century when
employers' liability acts were passed that modified or abolished the
7
common law defenses that so regularly defeated plaintiff workers.1
Judges already fond of strictly construing any statute passed in
derogation of common law naturally objected to legislative tinkering with negligence law. The most notable occasion of anti-reform
judicial review was in The Employers' Liability Cases.3s There, the
United States Supreme Court struck down Congress' 1906 Employers' Liability Act, a law abolishing the (contributorily negligent)
fellow servant defense and installing a comparative negligence system for the benefit of employees of "common carriers engaged in
commerce between the states."' 9
The Supreme Court in The Employers' Liability Cases strained
to read the congressional policy imposing comparative negligence
principles on common carriers 40 so broadly that a Court majority
concluded Congress was attempting to unconstitutionally regulate
intrastate as well as interstate operations. 41 It is difficult when re36. Id. at 363. Professor Smith opined further that "many lawyers" would resist the extension of the workers' compensation theory to other than injured workers. Id. at 367. On
the other hand, with respect to actual lawyer reaction to proposed workers' compensation
bills, a typical response was the pro-compensation report from the Ohio State Bar, stressing
the merit of there being "no contingent fees to absorb half of the compensation. It may
work hardship on certain lawyers, but they will get into better employment." Compensation
Law, 8 OHIo L. REP. 191 (1910). See also Cunningham v. Northwestern Improvement Co., 44
Mont 180, 211, 119 P. 554, 562 (Mont. 1911) ("legislation of this nature [workers' compensation] is in its infancy, and if it be found adequate to correct the evils growing out of the
present system it may gradually be extended to apply to all extra hazardous employments."); Rollins, A Proposal to Extend the Compensation Principle to Accidents in the
Streets, 4 MAss. L.Q. 392 (1919).
37. Rhodes, supra note 33, at 41-42. Rhodes reports that "the necessity for changes in
the common law system was becoming recognized in the United States during the last quarter of the nineteenth century." Id. at 36.
38. Howard v. Illinois Central Ry., 207 U.S. 463 (1907).
39. 34 Stat. 3073 (1906).
40. Howard, 207 U.S. at 499.
41. Id. at 496-502. This was the period when the concept of interstate commerce was still
relatively narrow, and it was therefore a simple matter for the Court to save the fellow
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viewing The Employers' Liability Cases not to be shocked at the
aggressiveness of the Supreme Court's defense of the bar's common law heritage against the legislative invaders. Although Congress' 1906 language describing the scope of the Employers' Liability Act may have been somewhat ambiguous, the constitutional axe
was hardly called for.
Congress' language limiting the Act's coverage to "common carriers engaged in commerce between the states" need not have been
read to cover local activities of common carriers that did even a
partially interstate business; the Act easily could have been
deemed to cover only the interstate operations of common carriers.
Given the well-known limits on the commerce power, and the
Court's oft-professed practice of avoiding constitutional issues,4 2
reading the Employers' Liability Act constitutionally to reach only
interstate business would have been very appropriate. This is especially true as both plaintiffs in these combined cases were working
in interstate travel when they were hurt.
Justice Moody's dissent in The Employers' Liability Cases cuts
through the shallow rhetoric of the commerce clause argument to
chastise the majority for their misplaced loyalty to the withered
hand of the common law past. Moody also raises a matter still
alive today as legislators grapple with the failings of tort law:
should common law courts step aside and give legislators ample
room to set economic (tort) policy. Moody concludes:
The common-law rules have taken form through the decisions of
courts, whose judges in announcing them were controlled by their
views of what justice and sound public policy demanded .... But
the economic opinions of judges and their views of the requirements of justice and public policy, even when crystallized into
well-settled doctrines of law, have no constitutional sanctity ....
Legislators have their own economic theories, their own views of
justice and public policy, and their views when embodied in a
written law must prevail. Whenever the legislative power to
change any of these rules of the common law has been drawn in
43
question in this court it has been sustained.
servant defense by reading the Employers' Liability Act broadly so as to set up a conflict
with the then-narrow boundaries of congressional commerce power.
42. A portion of Justice Moody's long dissent documents the Court's practice of reading
legislative acts so as to prefer, among alternative readings, that version most readily consistent with the Constitution. Id. at 509-519.
43. Id. at 537-38. The Supreme Court by 1911 saw its way clear to sustain later employers' liability acts. See Second Employers' Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1911). Justice Moody's
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ConstitutionalBlock to a Workers' Compensation Act

The highwater mark in judicial willingness to place a constitutional stumbling block in the way of interfering legislators is the
New York Court of Appeals' disapproval of that state's compulsory
45
workers' compensation act 44 in Ives v. South Buffalo Railway Co.
Chief Justice Cullen in Ives could imagine no legal world (at least
where substantive due process is king) in which tort liability could
be based on any principle save fault. Cullen's words in Ives, though
out of place in today's more restrained legal discourse, nevertheless
reflect the undercurrent of lawyerly attachment to the fault system
which still runs deep: "It is the physical law of nature, not of government, that imposes upon one meeting with an injury, the suffering occasioned thereby . . . . I know of no principle on which one
can be compelled to indemnify another for loss unless it is based
' 46
upon contractual obligation or fault."
Furthermore, the Ives court saw no policy justification for workplace compensation plans because, in that court's odd view, compensation for the injured "does nothing to conserve the health,
safety, or morals of the employe's [siC]. ''4 7 The Ives majority then
issued the call to constitutional arms for all those who see today's
judges as properly exercising judicial veto power over tort reform
legislation:
Under our form of government, however, courts must regard all
economic, philosophical, and moral theories, attractive and desirable though they may be, as subordinate to the primary question
[of constitutionality] .... [Tihe rigidity of a written Constitution
may at times prove to be a hindrance to the march of progress,
deference to legislative solutions for compensating accident victims apparently represents
current federal constitutional law. See supra note 15 and infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text. It is only in state courts that defenders of the status quo in torts have of late
asserted state constitutional claims successfully.
44. 1910 N.Y. Laws § 674. Entitled "An act to amend the labor law, in relation to workmen's compensation in certain dangerous employments," New York's law was modeled on
the English act of 1897, and was promulgated only after a thorough commission study of the
negative impact of traditional negligence doctrines in the workplace and of the likely effects
of a mandatory compensation insurance program. See supra note 33, at 51-52.
45. 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
46. Id. at 449 (Cullen, C.J., concurring). The Ives court grounded its ruling of unconstitutionality on the due process clauses of both the state and federal Constitutions. Id. at 439.
47. Id. at 442. For a contemporary review of Ives that found something good to say
about both sides of the due process issue, see Bruce, The New York Employers' Liability
Act, 9 MIcH. L. REv. 684 (1911).
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yet more often its stability protects the people against the fre' 48
quent and violent fluctuations of. . . 'public opinion.

Despite Ives, workers' compensation laws soon carried the day,
and when the United States Supreme Court gave federal due process approval to compensation acts, the justices asserted that "[n]o
person has a vested interest in any rule of law entitling him to
'
insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit."49
When in
1929 the Supreme Court rejected an equal protection attack on a
state statute stripping automobile guest passengers of their traditional negligence action, the Court said that the United States
Constitution "does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the common law, to attain a permissible legislative object." 50 Yet despite the Supreme Court's
traditional deference to legislative amendment of common law
torts, that Court never closed the door to judicial review. 51 This
crack in the door has given courage of late to state court judges in
Florida and elsewhere to sit in constitutional judgment over statutory reform.
III.

MORE RECENT JUDIcIAL REvIEw

The United States Supreme Court has recently reinforced its
hands-off policy regarding tort reform by refusing to review two
48. Ives, 94 N.E. at 437. The "public opinion" of New Yorkers referred to in the text in
fact worked to amend the state constitution in 1913 to reverse Ives. Later, the state legislature enacted another compensation act which the Supreme Court concluded met due process requirements. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). Shortly after Ives,
other state courts rejected Ives and upheld workers' compensation statutes. See, e.g., In re
Opinion of Justices, 209 Mass. 607, 96 N.E. 308 (1911); State v. Clausen, 65 Wash. 156, 117
P. 1101 (1911); Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133 N.W. 209 (1911).
49. New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917) (citations omitted). The
Court also rejected due process claims to a jury trial and an equal protection argument
keyed to the New York act's exclusions from coverage of farm laborers and domestic servants. Id. at 208. The Court in White explicitly left open the question whether, consistent
with the United States Constitution, a state "could abolish all rights of action on the one
hand, or all defenses on the other, without setting up something adequate in their stead."
Id. at 201.
50. Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929) (citations omitted).
51.
See White, 243 U.S. at 188. The closest the Court has come to foreclosing federal
judicial review of tort reform was to conclude that in White it was unnecessary, "for the
purposes of the present case, to say that a State might, without violence to the constitutional guarantee of 'due process of law,' suddenly set aside all common-law rules respecting
liability as between employer and employee, without providing a reasonably just substitute." Id. at 201.
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California Supreme Court medical malpractice cases5 2 upholding
statutory limits on pain and suffering awards5s and attorneys'
fees.54 The Court, moreover, when it recently approved the nuclear
accident damage limits imposed by Congress' Price-Anderson Act,
stated that "it is not at all clear that the Due Process Clause in
fact requires that a legislatively enacted compensation scheme either duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a reasonable
substitute remedy."5 5
However, this "reasonable substitute remedy" requirement that
the Supreme Court refused to adopt has surfaced in Florida's
courts. In the 1970s high liability insurance rates prompted the
Florida Legislature to pass an automobile no-fault act,5" statutes of
repose, 7 and a medical mediation act mandating pretrial medical
malpractice panels. 58 Constitutional attacks on these reforms met
with some success in the Florida Supreme Court despite the low
esteem into which doctrines smacking of economic substantive due
process have generally fallen. Resourceful Florida justices merely
devised a new constitutional rationale for demanding a "reasonable
substitute," and declared in Kluger v. White5 9 that this new constitutional rationale is grounded in the open courts language of article I, section 21, of the Florida Constitution: "The courts shall be
open to every person for redress of any injury, and justice shall be
administered without sale, denial or delay."
52. Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368
(1985) (cap on pain and suffering awards), appeal dismissed for want of a substantialfederal question, 106 S.Ct. 214 (1985); Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d 920, 695 P.
2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1985) (cap on attorneys' fees), appeal dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 421
(1985).
53. CAL.CIv. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1987) (limiting noneconomic losses in medical
malpractice cases to $250,000). For a recent case finding equal protection defects in a statutory cap on damages assessed against public entities, see Pfost v. Montana, 713 P.2d 495
(Mont. 1985).
54. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp. 1987) (limiting attorneys' fees in medical
malpractice cases to a schedule that includes a 10% cap on awards over $200,000).
55. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978).
56. FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.741 (1971).
57. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (1975); supra note 11 and accompanying text; FLA. STAT. §
95.11(4)(b) (1975) (medical malpractice), analyzed for possible constitutional defects in
Note, The Florida Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975, 4 FLA ST. U.L. REv. 50, 64-65
(1976); and FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (1975) (products liability and fraud actions).
58. FLA. STAT. § 768.44 (1979).
59. 281 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1973).
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A. The Open Courts Provision
The wording of Florida's open courts provision, though much revised, has found a place in all the state's past constitutions.60 A
similar provision is present in the constitutions of two-thirds of the
states. 61 In addition, the New Mexico Supreme Court recently read
into that state's due process clause an implied open courts guarantee. 2 Yet, despite the popularity of open courts provisions, the
original intention of constitutional drafters is unclear. Whatever
the historical anxieties prompting open courts clauses in Florida's
parade of constitutions, 3a that shadowy history has little relevance
in the current fight between judges and legislators over the future
direction of tort law.
In the past decade and a half, however, state courts in Florida
and elsewhere have nevertheless begun to subject various tort reform measures to an open courts test. Half the courts, though,
have rejected arguments that open courts clauses place constitutional limits on legislative power to modify tort doctrines. 4 Some
courts that refuse to read an open courts clause so as to handcuff
legislative reform believe a literal reading of such clauses would
shift massive policymaking authority to judges and unduly deprive
legislatures of power to revise tort law.'
60. FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. 1, § 9; FLA. CONST. of 1861, art. 1, § 9; FLA CONST. of 1865,
art. 1, § 9; FLA. CONST. of 1885, § 4 Dec. of Rights. With the 1968 revision of the Florida
Constitution, section 4 of the Declaration of Rights became article 1, § 21, and the provision's language was condensed into its present form.
61. See McGovern, The Variety, Policy and Constitutionalityof Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 579, 615 n.218 (1981). Apparently, the Magna Carta started
the ball rolling: "to no one will we sell, to no one will we deny, or delay right of justice." Id.
at n.219.
62. Jiron v. Mahlab, 99 N.M. 425, 659 P.2d 311, 312 (1983) (holding that New Mexico's
statutory medical malpractice procedure requiring pretrial review by a nonjudicial panel
denies open courts).
63. Apparently, the drafters of the Magna Carta's open courts provision were concerned
about the royal practice of selling justice, or the right to delay or deny justice, for the price
of a fine. See Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 201 (R.I. 1984) (Murray, J.,
dissenting).
64. For a survey of decisions judging the constitutionality of various statutes of repose
under open courts clauses, see McGovern, supra note 61, at 616-18; Case Note, Manufacturers Must Seek Alternative Limitations to Liability as New Hampshire Supreme Court
Strikes Down State Statute of Repose: Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 18 SUFFOLK UL.
REv. 757, 767-69 (1984).
65. See, e.g., Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 281, 382 A.2d 715,
721 (1978). For the view that an open courts clause expresses no constitutional mandate, but
merely a philosophy of access, see Thornton v. Mono Mfg. Co., 99 Ill. App. 3d 722, 425
N.E.2d 522, 526 (1981). Another judicial response which strips the open courts clause of
substantive teeth by limiting its effect to the preservation of procedural rights is found in
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At the other end of the spectrum are those courts that, like Florida's high court in Kluger, have applied open courts provisions to
insulate common law torts from reforms that shock the judicial
conscience." Until the recent crisis in tort law, the promise of open
courts in Florida's article I, section 21, was a constitutional lightweight, most often mentioned as an afterthought in conjunction
with due process and other constitutional provisions pertaining to
procedural issues6 7 Prior to Kluger, in other words, Florida's open
courts provision was considered more or less redundant.
B.

The Kluger Opinion

Some state court judges in dealing with the recent invasion by
legislatures into the tort area have found open courts clauses convenient justifications - along with other constitutional guarantees
of equal protection, jury trials, due process, and prohibitions
against special laws - for exercising sometimes aggressive judicial
review. 8 The "polestar decision for the construction" 9 of Florida's
open courts clause is the Kluger court's voiding of the property
damage provisions of the state's no-fault auto insurance act. As the
tort reform movement gathered steam, Kluger gave notice to the
Florida Legislature that the justices would not sit by and watch
tort doctrines displaced without at least a few delaying actions.
The passage of limited no-fault auto insurance acts by nearly
half the states in the early 1970s was accomplished despite the inPinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592, 600 (1971) (upholding the state's first-inthe-nation automobile no-fault statute).
66. See, e.g., Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 123 N.H. 512, 464 A.2d 288, 294-96 (1983)
(12-year products liability statute of repose voided); Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty,
416 So. 2d 996, 1003-04 (Ala. 1982) (10-year statute of repose voided).
67. See generally Note, Article I, Section 21: Access to Courts in Florida,5 FLA. ST. U.L.
REV.

871 (1977).

68. McGovern, supra note 61, at 604. See also Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 132
(N.D. 1978), for that court's invalidating of the North Dakota Medical Malpractice Act in
the name of substantive economic due process, which "North Dakota has never renounced.
as a constitutional standard ...."
Florida's open court's clause is now being called into the Florida Bar's service to protect
lawyers against the state's new five percent sales tax on a wide variety of services. The
president of the Florida Bar filed suit challenging the tax on lawyer services the week following the Florida Supreme Court's voiding, in the name of open courts, the legislature's
$450,000 ceiling on noneconomic damages. Cotterell, Lawsuits Filed Against Services Tax,
Tallahassee Democrat, May 2, 1987, at 1A, col. 1. If the open courts clause can insulate
Florida lawyers from such a tall damages ceiling as $450,000, and also from a general sales
tax, the clause should be renamed the be-kind-to-lawyers clause.
69. Overland Constr. Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572, 573 (Fla. 1979) (majority opinion by
England, C.J.).
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tense, and partly successful, opposition of lawyers.70 Judicial opposition to no-fault auto insurance may also have been indicated by
the eagerness of some high court judges to initiate some form of
comparative negligence. By promising more relief for traffic victims
through the common-law adoption of comparative fault, these
judges perhaps hoped to foil legislative proponents of automobile
no-fault, or at least to hold no-fault coverage down to small
claims. 71 Such judicial reformation of the common law by sweeping
comparative fault announcements highlights a supreme irony in
this tort reform struggle: the juxtaposition of judicial willingness to
initiate broad reforms in areas such as products liability and charitable immunities, alongside judicial insistence that tort-reforming
legislatures bow to judicial vetoes grounded in vague constitutional
allusions to open courts, jury trials, and so forth.72
Before the Kluger court killed the no-fault section that stripped
automobile owners of tort claims regarding minor property damage, the no-fault law required Floridians who wished to secure
these property interests to buy first-party insurance with respect
to the first $550 of damages arising out of an automobile accident.
It was in part because of the high transaction costs in administering such nuisance claims that liability insurance premiums became
so costly. The legislature, by forcing automobile operators to either
buy collision insurance or gamble with respect to dented fenders,
hoped to reduce the total cost of car insurance and thus make the
new no-fault act attractive. 7s
70. "[No-fault auto reform] has run into a stone wall in state legislatures across the
country ....
In state after state, the plan has been defeated or bottled up in committees,
often through the efforts of powerful lobbies of lawyer groups and insurance companies,
both of which are heavily represented among members of state legislatures." King, 'NoFault' Auto Insuranceis Stalled in Legislatures, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1970, at 70, cols. 4-5;
See also J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN 158 (1979); Morris,
Few States Expected to Act This Year on Proposals for No-Fault Insurance, N.Y. Times,
May 9, 1971, at 60, cols. 1-3.
71. Since the late 1960's saw such a rush, by judges and legislators alike, to comparative
negligence, some commentators have suggested that one motive was to undermine proponents of no-fault auto insurance. See, e.g., M. FRANKLIN & R. RABIN, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES

372 (3d ed. 1983). The Florida Supreme Court added com-

parative fault to state tort law in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
72. See Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555 (1985). A similar
irony dwells among members of the personal injury bar who "have loudly applauded-and
indeed often initiated-moves toward increased liability and compensation, yet they invariably oppose compensation so freely available that litigable issues vanish." J. O'CONNELL &

R.

HENDERSON, TORT LAW, No-FAULT AND BEYOND

66 (1975).

73. Note, FloridaSupreme Court Finds Fault With No-Fault, 28 U.
469 (1974).

MIAMI

L.

REV.

468,
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The Kluger court began its review of the legislature's removal of

dented-fender claims from the tort system by recognizing that it
had never before considered whether "the constitutional guarantee
of [open courts] bars the statutory abolition of an existing remedy
without providing an alternative protection.

' 74

The court, forego-

ing an economic analysis which might make comparisons between
no-fault and a traditional fault system meaningful, plunged ahead
to create a standard for evaluating legislative tort reform that casts
a constitutional cloud on much of the reform legislation coming
out of Tallahassee. 7" Under the Kluger test, statutory reform that
withdraws a common law tort remedy must provide what the court
found missing in the legislature's scheme for dented-fender losses:
"[A] reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the people of
the State to redress for injuries [or else] show an overpowering
public necessity for the abolishment of such right .... 1-7"
Given the Kuger court's judgment that Florida courts should
vigorously review reform legislation, what about the quality of the
Kluger review itself? The court's principal failing was in how the
justices applied their "reasonable alternative" test. The court, by
refusing to look at the no-fault act in its entirety, failed to balance
the act's total contribution to the economic welfare of traffic victims against the act's partial abolition of tort claims for both personal injuries and property damages. Instead, the court took a
piecemeal approach and focused only on that portion of the nofault act that removed dented-fender claims from the tort system.

77

The court's tunnel vision led it to inquire only whether the

legislature provided any precise quid pro quo for taking away the
tort action for the first $550 of automobile damage.
Even given the court's piecemeal approach, there is a good argument that the no-fault act actually gave auto owners a precise quid
pro quo for their lost dented-fender claim. The Kluger court, however, neglected to mention that in exchange for the lost cause of
action for the dented fender, the no-fault act gave each owner a
personal $550 exemption from tort liability for the other party's
dented fender. Another no-fault trade-off the court overlooked was
the auto owner's chance to escape the higher insurance premium
attributable to small property claims.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1973).
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 2.
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Thus the Florida Supreme Court objected to the legislature's
judgment that auto owners in dented-fender situations be given an
option to either buy first-party insurance or gamble. The Kluger
court suggested, oddly, that had the legislature mandated that
drivers buy first-party protection against dented fenders, a "reasonable alternative" to open courts would have been provided.
Yet surely a legislature that can mandate first-party insurance can
elect to give the vehicle owner the option to buy collision coverage.
The Kluger court seemed to say that a "reasonable alternative"
must somehow translate into specific sums of money in the traffic
victim's pocket.
Of course, the realistic way to weigh the losses and benefits of
automobile no-fault is to consider all the trade-offs, including the
guaranteed partial compensation for economic losses and medical
expenses growing out of personal injury. This the Florida Supreme
Court failed to do in Kluger. A year later, however, the court backtracked when reviewing the personal injury part of the no-fault
auto insurance act. It sustained the act's abolition of below-threshold pain and suffering damages by finding elsewhere in the act
"reasonable" trade-offs in the form of benefits such as the limited
immunity from tort liability for pain and suffering which automo79
bile owners covered by no-fault insurance enjoy,
If the Kluger court's piecemeal strategy for administering its
"reasonable alternative" test were invoked outside the Kluger
facts, logic would dictate ruling unconstitutional not only much of
automobile no-fault, but also much of workers' compensation law.
Workers' compensation statutes, of course, alter prior legal rights
at common law much more drastically than does automobile nofault. For example, workers' compensation acts abolish all pain and
suffering awards and provide no specific alternative remedy by
which injured workers may recoup such losses. Fortunately, the
Kluger logic contained in Justice Adkins' majority opinion has
78. Id. at 5.
79. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 13-14 (Fla. 1974). What if the Florida
Legislature had written its auto no-fault law as a complete substitute for the personal injury
claim, similar to the replacement of that law by workers' compensation acts? Perhaps we
would have seen Ives II in the Florida reports. Compare with California Supreme Court's
judgment upholding abolition of unlimited noneconomic damages in medical malpractice
cases: "[T]he preservation of a viable medical malpractice insurance industry in this state
[would provide the necessary quid pro quo]." Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal.3d
137, 695 P.2d 665, 681-682 n.18, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985) appeal dismissed 106 S.Ct. 214
(1985).
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stayed at home,10 almost as if the court knows better than to push
its power of judicial review too far. The Kluger dissenters argued
that the court should defer to the legislature's tort reform efforts,
noting the similar defects in the tort system that led to both workers' compensation and automobile no-fault. The dissenting justices,
after emphasizing the extensive legislative investigations which led
to Florida's no-fault act, concluded that auto no-fault, like workers' compensation, is for "the greater good of society and social
justice."81
IV.

LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS AT REFORM

Mandatory no-fault auto insurance was but one of several responses to rising liability insurance rates adopted by the Florida
Legislature in the 1970s. Among these reforms were statutes of repose which set time limits for selected tort actions. These repose
deadlines for filing claims begin running not when injury occured
or is discovered, but from the date of a defendant's questioned
conduct. One such Florida statute of repose, which limited to
twelve years possible law-suits against engineers, architects, and
contractors arising out of real estate construction,"2 was struck
down, on the authority of Kluger, in Overland Construction Co. v.
Sirmons.8 3
The court in Sirmons dealt with a negligence claim arising out of
an accident in a building erected by the defendant contractor and
accepted by the owner fourteen years earlier. The injured plaintiff
was not in privity with defendant contractor. Until late in the life
of the common law, such a contractor, absent privity and after acceptance of a completed building, was not liable in tort for negligent work.8 4 The Florida Supreme Court reformed tort law in 1959
80. Also difficult to square with Kluger is McMillan v. Nelson, 149 Fla. 334, 5 So. 2d 867
(1942), in which the court approved as constitutional a guest act which stripped automobile
guest passengers of their negligence actions (as distinguished from gross negligence actions)
against drivers. The three dissenting justices in Kluger took a broader view of the no-fault
act; they compared the worth of the act's total payoffs against the traditional tort action.
Kluger, 281 So. 2d at 5-10 (Boyd, J., dissenting). The dissenters cited extensively from the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's constitutional validation of that state's groundbreaking automobile no-fault statute. See Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 271 N.E.2d 592
(1971). The Massachusetts court rejected a claim of unconstitutionality based upon an open
courts clause much like Florida's.
81. Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 10 (Fla. 1973).
82. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (1975).
83. 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979).
84. See generally W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 722 (5th ed.
1984).
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to deprive independent contractors of this traditional tort immunity and recognized a post-acceptance cause of action."
Yet in Sirmons, the court boldly told reform legislators that
their statute-of-repose modifications of this newly-minted judicial
tort violated article I, section 21's open courts promise. The Sirmons majority made no mention of crisis, either real or illusory, in
liability insurance, and therefore found no "public necessity,""
overpowering or otherwise, for legislative intervention. Nor did the
justices in Sirmons discuss other Florida statutes of repose8 7 when
they criticized this particular statute of repose for real estate improvements as special legislation benefiting "only one class of
'88
defendants.
The court did recognize, however, that most other state courts
have ruled constitutional similar statutes of repose passed in recent years as crisis legislation in response to consumer anguish
over rising insurance rates. Chief Justice England in Sirmons nevertheless argued that Florida's open courts standard is a higher
hurdle for tort reform statutes than are state or federal due process or equal protection clauses. 89 Even so, the Florida Supreme
Court's record in statute-of-repose cases, both before and after Sirmons, indicates a certain judicial nervousness in the face of the
reform movement.
One year before Sirmons, the court in Bauld v. J. A. Jones Construction Co.,90 sustained the constitutionality of the twelve-year
statute of repose for actions against distributors of defective products. Bauld's facts were somewhat different from those in Sirmons
as the plaintiff in Bauld had a cause of action that matured somewhat prior to the statute-of-repose cutoff and therefore had the
opportunity to file suit before repose set in. Thus the court in Sirmons insisted that Bauld was distinguishable.' But the result in
Sirmons can hardly be squared with these words from Bauld:
"[The state's repose deadlines] did not abolish any right of access
to the courts; they merely laid down conditions upon the exercise
9' 2
of such a right.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Slavin v. Kay, 108 So. 2d 462, 465-67 (Fla. 1959).
Sirmons, 369 So. 2d at 574.
See supra note 57.
Sirmons, 369 So. 2d at 574.
Id. at 575.
357 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1978).
Sirmons, 369 So. 2d at 574.
Bauld, 357 So. 2d at 402.
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Finally, the court in Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Manufacturing
Co.,9 3 three years after adopting in Bauld a tolerant posture regarding repose for defective products suits, changed direction and
ruled that the state's twelve-year statute of repose for products liability cases did, after all, unconstitutionally limit court access. So
with Batilla in 1981, a court which only eight years earlier had
itself turned tort law around by replacing the contributory negligence doctrine with comparative negligence,9 4 saw fit to slap legislators down for enacting a modest statute of repose.
But Batilla was short-lived. A nervous Florida Supreme Court
receded from Batilla in Pullum v. Cincinnati,Inc.." Now, a statute of repose in defective products cases squares with the open
courts provision, although the repose law killed in Sirmons is still
dead because, the court reasoned in Pullum, the "useful life of
buildings is obviously greater [and thus the twelve-year repose
deadline harsher] than most manufactured products."9 6 The court
in Pullum moreover backed off from the aggressive Kluger stance
by diluting Kluger's "reasonable alternative" and "overpowering
public necessity" tests. Pullum asked only whether the statutory
repose period bore a "rational relationship to a proper state objective. ' 97 Whether Pullum means the Florida Supreme Court will
hereafter play a more restrained role in reviewing legislative tort
reform remains to be seen. The court's 1987 voiding just before
this article went to press of the legislative cap on pain and suffering damages, unless reversed on rehearing, suggests that future
deference to the state legislature in these matters is far from
assured.
A.

The Medical Mediation Act

Another yes-and-no performance by the Florida Supreme Court
in litigation surrounding modern tort reform involved the Florida
Medical Mediation Act. 98 Before this act was ruled unconstitutional in Aldana v. Holub,99 much to the delight of plaintiffs' law93. 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980). Accord Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195
(R.I. 1984). Only a handful of the states' highest courts have considered constitutional challenges to products liability statutes of repose. Id. at 203 (Murray, J., dissenting).
94. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
95. 476 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1985).
96. Id. at 660 (quoting Battilla v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980)
(McDonald, J., dissenting)).
97. Id.

98.

FLA. STAT.

99.

381 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1980).

§ 768.44 (1979).
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yers, the act prescribed preliminary hearings in medical malpractice suits before mediation panels consisting of a doctor, a lawyer,
and a judge. 00 The legislature hoped mediation would work to
eliminate frivolous malpractice suits and facilitate early settlements of meritorious claims.' 0 '
Aldana involved two doctors who, as defendants in medical malpractice cases, petitioned the high court for an extension in their
cases of the statutory ten-month period for panel hearings. 02 In
practice, Florida's mediation panels sometimes had trouble meeting the ten-month deadline for action. 10 3 The defendant doctors in
Aldana, however, got much more than they asked for. These doctors did not wish to destroy a mediation procedure that the medical profession lobbied through the legislature. Rather, they attempted to enlist the justices' help in making the procedure
flexible so that doctors who through no fault of their own missed a
panel review within ten months might receive a delayed panel review. The result in Aldana, however, was that the doctors not only
were denied a panel review, but that the Florida medical profession's prized'0 4 Mediation Act was declared violative of the due
process clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions.
Members of a judical system in which justice moves only slightly
faster than it did in Charles Dickens' Bleak House ruled that jus05
tice delayed is justice denied.
100. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(2) (1979).
101. Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 239 (Alderman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). A
principle component of the Medical Mediation Act was a provision making a panel's conclusion on the question of medical negligence available to the jury in the event of a trial. FLA.
STAT. § 768.47(2) (1979).
102. FLA. STAT. § 768.44(3) (1979): "If no hearing on the merits is held within 10 months
of the date the claim is filed, the jurisdiction of the mediation panel on the subject matter
shall terminate, and the parties may proceed [to trial]."
103. The court in Aldana referred to 26 district court cases in which mediation jurisdiction was terminated because of inaction within the 10-month period; 15 of these terminations were "no fault of either party." Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 236 n.11. The justices in Aldana
expressed intolerance with delay beyond the Act's 10-month period for a panel hearing, an
intolerance, however, which apparently did little to speed up judicial procedures, as evidenced by the Aldana appeal itself in which the court first heard oral arguments on September 22, 1978, and then waited a full year-and-a-half later to decide the case. The cases
consolidated in Aldana were originally filed in circuit court in the summer of 1976; four
years in court, and yet no trial! See Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 233-34. See generally Ehrhardt,
One Thousand Seven Hundred Days: A History of Medical Malpractice Mediation Panels
in Florida, 8 FLA. ST. U.L. Rav. 165 (1980).
104. See Cunningham & Lane, Malpractice-The Illusory Crisis, 54 FLA. B.J. 114
(1980).
105. Aldana v. Holub, 381 So. 2d 231, 238 (Fla. 1980).
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The reasoning the court used to explain the death of mediation
panels is convoluted. The court did not say mediation panels are a
bad idea, or that selecting alleged victims of medical malpractice
out for mediation treatment is invidiously discriminatory. The
court seemed to say, rather, that because the Mediation Act, as
interpreted by the court, denied a few defendant doctors a chance
for mediation panel review, the act therefore discriminated among
doctors in a manner violative of fair procedure. The key to the
court's procedural due process ruling (with help from the Florida
Constitution's open courts language) was the court's characterization of the Mediation Act's ten-month deadline for a panel hearing
as a jurisdictional time limit.1 0'6
As all lawyers know, the principal function of a time limitation
for a legal procedure is to give judges a starting point for granting
that first continuance. To carve out of the vastness of the world of
law a firm courthouse date which no judge can set asunder is an
almost impossible burden. Even in Aldana, the court recognized
that the ten-month statutory goal for panel hearings can sometimes be extended for special occasions.' 0 7 Nevertheless, the court
seemed to sense in the Mediation Act's ten-month period for panel
hearings some special urgency which led it to characterize the tenmonth deadline as "jurisdictional.' 1 8 The court failed to explain
why Mediation Act time periods are "jurisdictional," or why a circuit court judge cannot for good cause, such as the death of a panel
member,' 09 extend the Act's ten-month time limit. All the court
could do was pull out article I, section 21, and praise "speedy access to the courts of Florida," 1 0 as if the open courts provision was
relevant to an interpretation of the Florida Mediation Act.
Given, however, the court's "jurisdictional" time limit on panel
hearings, why didn't the court simply tell the two Aldana doctors
that because the ten-month deadline had passed in their cases,
they must, therefore defend malpractice charges without panel reviews-and otherwise leave mediation panels alive? After all, the
Mediation Act had, four years earlier, received constitutional ap106. Id. at 235.
107. Id. at 235-36.
108. Id. at 235.
109. See, e.g., Cole v. Burrows, 364 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (where jurisdiction of
the medical mediation panel terminated after the jurisdictional time limit ran, due to the
death of a panel member).
110. Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 235.
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proval from the Florida Supreme Court in Carter v. Sparkman."'
The Aldana answer was that Carter's endorsement of mediation
panels was made prior to much experience with the practical operation of the Mediation Act. According to the court's post-Carter
survey of district court decisions, 12 the Act's ten-month deadline
had operated to arbitrarily to cut off several opportunities for a
panel review. Because the Act had so operated in practice, the
court found Carter no bar to later due process review.
The court went on to insure that the Mediation Act's "jurisdictional," and thus inflexible, ten-month deadline could not be legislatively amended to revive the Act's mediation panels. The court
accomplished this by telling the legislature that to amend the Act
to allow continuances past ten months would run afoul of, what
else, the open courts requirement.1 1 3 As the court noted earlier in
Carter, "[T]he pre-litigation burden cast upon the claimant
reaches the outer limits of constitutional tolerance .... "' So it
was that a ten month delay barely was bearable, and eleven
months would violate article I, section 21, of the Florida
Constitution.' 1 5
111. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976).
112. Aldana, 381 So. 2d at 236-37.
113. Id. at 238.
114. Carter, 335 So. 2d at 806.
115. Medical malpractice mediation panels were a common legislative response around
the nation to the insurance crisis of the 1970's. A few courts responded like the Florida
Supreme Court by finding constitutional infirmities in such pre-litigation panel review. See,
e.g., Wright v. Central Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) (violation
of separation of powers and right to jury trial); Heller v. Frankston, 504 Pa. 528, 475 A.2d
1291 (1984) (review panel burdens right to jury trial), afl'g Mattos v. Thompson, 491 Pa.
385, 421 A.2d 190 (1980); Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983) (violation of medical
malpractice victim's equal protection guarantee under circumstances where judicial notice
reveals lack of a medical malpractice crisis).
Medical malpractice panels established by legislation similar to the Florida Mediation Act
also have been sustained against constitutional attacks, including claims based on jury trial
guarantees. See, e.g., Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979); Eastin v.
Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La.
1978); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 282 Md. 274, 385 A.2d 57 (1978); Paro v. Longwood Hosp.,
373 Mass. 645, 369 N.E.2d 985 (1977); Predergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657
(1977); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), aff'd, 43
N.Y.2d 696, 372 N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977); State ex rel. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81
Wis. 2d 491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978).
The New Hampshire Supreme Court, perhaps even more inhospitable than the Florida
Supreme Court to legislative tort reform, found the following statutory medical malpractice
reforms fell short of equal protection for malpractice plaintiffs: requirement that an expert
medical witness be expert in the area of practice alleged to have caused injury; abolition of
discovery rules except where a foreign object is discovered in a patient's body; requirement
of notice of intent to sue; abolition of the collateral source rule; discretionary provision for
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It is worth noting that just as the court felt justified in Aldana
in revisiting the constitutionality of mediation panels, the court
also has given notice that a revisiting of the personal injury portion
of the No-Fault Auto Insurance Act, in light of possible negative
experience with the law's application, is always possible."' A future court therefore could conceivably void no-fault auto insurance
by finding the statute an inadequate (Kluger) alternative to the
fault system because, for example, no-fault experience arguably
shows that: crowded court conditions have not been improved; insurance costs have not been reduced; the traditional tort system
has not been shown inadequate to the task of fairly compensating
traffic victims; or that the crisis in torts giving rise to no-fault legislation, if ever such a crisis in fact existed, is no longer in
17
evidence.'
B.

Amendment Nine

The Florida high court's most visible participation in the growing debate over torts involved not a statutory reform but a proposed state constitutional amendment. This was the widely publicized Amendment Nine which the mostly doctor members of
Reason '85, The Committee For Citizens' Rights In Civil Actions,
proposed in April, 1984, as a citizens' initiative for the general election ballot."68 Amendment Nine, if adopted, would have abolished
the common law's joint and several liability, limited pain and suffering damages to $100,000, and encouraged cost-saving grants of
summary judgments in damage suits." 9
One of the lawyerly groups opposing Amendment Nine, in addition to the Florida Bar and the state Academy of Trial Lawyers,
was Floridians Against Constitutional Tampering, led by former
periodic payments; and a contingent fee scale for plaintiffs' lawyers. Carson v. Maurer, 120
N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
116. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9, 17 (Fla. 1974). For a plea by a Florida
plaintiffs' lawyer for the Florida Supreme Court to aggressively review no-fault experience
for signs of late-developing constitutional defects, see Levin, Visiting Florida's No-Fault
Experience: Is It Now Constitutional?,54 FLA. B.J. 123-128 (1980).
117. See Lasky, 296 So. 2d at 16. Representatives of a leading Florida plaintiffs' firm
make the case for the "illusory" crisis in medical practice in Cunningham & Lane, supra
note 104, at 119-21. Another allegedly illusory area, according to trial lawyers, is the series
of media reports allegedly inflating the size of average jury awards in personal injury cases.
See Misuse of Tort Statistics Clouds Debate, 29 ATLA L. REP. 51 (1986).
118. Note, Amendment Nine and the Initiative Process: A Costly Trip to Nowhere, 14
STETSON L. REV. 349 (1985)[hereinafter Costly Trip].
119. Amendment taken off ballot, Tallahassee Democrat, Oct. 4, 1984, at Al, col. 2. See
also How the Doctors Spell Relief, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 17, 1984, at 73.
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Florida Supreme Court Justice Alan Sundberg."10 Sundberg, who
authored the majority opinion in Aldana burying mediation panels
and who also judged that automobile no-fault's partial elimination
21
of pain and suffering damages was an open courts infringement,1
preached compassion at a press conference blast against Amendment Nine: "Our society has always been sympathetic and empathetic to innocent victims .... Why should we shift our concern
from the innocent victim to the [wrongdoer]?"12" Agreeing with
Sundberg that the doctor-sponsored citizens' initiative was bad
medicine was the president of ATLA: "[T]his is not a lawyers v.
doctors fight, but a battle for the rights of every citizen in the state
of Florida, and indeed of this nation ....
The trial lawyer very
often stands alone between the unfortunate victims and the monied powers that seek to curtail citizens' rights ....
111
The Florida Supreme Court in October, 1984, declared in Evans
v. Firestone124 that Amendment Nine was constitutionally defective, and removed that initiative from the November ballot. In so
doing, the court improved its reputation with plaintiffs' lawyers,
and perhaps also showed how far it is willing to go to slow tort
reform. 2 5 Yet, confident guessing about judicial motives here is
risky because the court's conduct in removing constitutional initiatives from ballots has been extremely erratic in recent years. A
brief review of the court's record on amendment initiatives may be
helpful in evaluating Evans v. Firestone.
120. Former chief justice blasts malpractice amendment, Tallahassee Democrat, Sept.
13, 1984, at B1, col. 1.
121. Chapman v. Dillon, 415 So. 2d 12, 19 (Fla. 1982) (dissenting opinion).
122. Amendment Taken off Ballot, supra. See also Orrick, FACT To Fight Amendment
9, Fla. Bar News, Sept. 1, 1984, at 1, col. 4, for a report on Justice Sundberg's alerting "the
public to the danger of recklessly tampering with our constitution."
123.

Baldwin, Who Shall Decide the Value of a Human Life, TRLL, Oct. 4, 1984, at 4.

124. 457 So. 2d 1351 (Fla. 1984).
125. The court's October decision came so near election day that Amendment Nine proponents had no time to cure their initiative's ills and have a corrected proposal ready by
election day. This was not the first time Florida voters have been denied an opportunity to
express their views on proposed constitutional amendments due to last-minute ballot deletions ordered by the Florida Supreme Court. For example, the court has removed from the
ballot amendment proposals for a unicameral legislature, Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824
(Fla. 1970), and for requiring financial disclosure by ex-legislators serving as lobbyists,
Askew v. Firestone, 421 So. 2d 151 (Fla. 1982). In the case of Amendment Nine in 1984,
doctors who supported the doomed initiative and trial lawyers in opposition together spent
$5 million pressing their cases with voters who never got to vote. Amendment Taken Off
Ballot, supra note 119.
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27
This odd series of cases began in 1970126 when the court ruled
that a proposed people's amendment for a unicameral legislature
was outside the permissible limits of the 1968 Florida Constitution's reservation to the people of the "power to propose amendments to any section of this constitution.' 12 The court declared
the unicameral idea so "revolutionary" 12 9 a change as to amount to
a revision of the entire constitution, and so outside the constitutional power granted the people to propose amendments to individual sections. 30
Following the Supreme Court's niggardly 1970 reading of the
scope of the citizens' initiative privilege, a seemingly displeased
Florida Legislature in 1972 initiated a redrafting of article XI, section 3, to authorize "revolutionary" initiatives: "The power to propose the revision or amendment of any portion or portions of this
constitution by initiative is reserved to the people, provided that,
but one subject and
any such revision or amendment shall 1embrace
3
'
therewith.
connected
directly
matter
Since this 1972 expansion of initiative rights, the legal debate
concerning attacks on citizen initiatives has shifted. The favorite
attack today is to assert that an initiative contains at least two
subjects and so is disqualified from appearing on a general election
ballot. 13 2 Even though the supreme court has heard a number of
post-1972 claims that a proposed initiative violates the "one subject" limitation in the current article XI, section 3,133 the court has
been unable to give much meaning to the "one subject" requirement. Still the court appears willing to act aggressively on occasion
to keep off the ballot initiative proposals such as Amendment
Nine's proposed tort reforms.
After two post-1972 decisions approving initiatives in which the
court chose to play a passive role, 3 in 1984 the court in the Evans

126. See Costly Trip, supra note 118, at 368.
127. Gunter, 238 So. 2d at 824.
128. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1968).
129. Gunter, 238 So. 2d at 830.
130. Id. at 829.
131. FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 3 (1968 amended 1972).
132. See, e.g., Fine v. Firestone, 448 So. 2d 984, 989 (Fla. 1984).
133. For an excellent explication of post-1972 Supreme Court discussions of article XI,
section 3's "one subject" limitation, see Costly Trip, supra note 118 at 358-62.
134. Floridians Against Casino Takeover v. Let's Help Florida, 363 So. 2d 337 (Fla.
1978) (proposed constitutional amendment to legalize gambling, its taxation, and distribution of taxes to educational institutions embodied only one subject); Weber v. Smathers, 338
So. 2d 819 (Fla. 1976) (proposed "Sunshine Amendment" promoting ethics in government
by requiring such things as financial disclosure by public employees and limitations on lob-
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attack on Amendment Nine (and in a suit attacking a citizens' initiative proposing California-type limits on state and local taxing
powers13 5 ) reassumed its activist posture. The earlier examples of
judicial deference were qualified, the "one subject" limit on initiative proposals was revived to cut down disfavored initiatives, and
the law was left pointing in two directions at once.
In the case of the ill-fated Amendment Nine, the court asserted
that the proposed tort reform initiative unconstitutionally dealt
with two subjects-limiting damages and promoting summary
judgments.13 6 Evans' weak rationalization for finding an impermissible double subject in Amendment Nine is the notion that limiting awards is one subject, a "legislative" function, and that the
summary judgment matter is another subject, a "judicial" function. The court in Evans, moreover, could see no connection, in
"one subject" terms, between limiting awards and promoting
greater reliance on the cost-saving summary judgment device. Although both reforms might work to reduce litigation costs and help
alleviate the insurance crisis, the court nevertheless perceived
1 7
qualitative differences. 3
So technical and legalistic was the Evans court's dismembering
of Amendment Nine's simple tort reform, it calls to mind Chief
Justice Ervin's 1970 dissent against killing the citizens' initiative
byists held constitutionally valid). The ambiguity inherent in a concept such as "one subject" is such that a court so inclined could reduce the concept to such a low level of generality that the constitutional citizens' initiative would become even more impotent and illusory
than Florida's is currently.
135. Fine, 448 So. 2d at 986.
136. Evans v. Firestone, 457 So. 2d 1351, 1354 (Fla. 1984).
137. Giving credence to the court's explanations of its "one subject" rulings is even more
difficult after Smith v. Department of Ins., 12 Fla. L.W. 189 (Fla. 1987). In Smith the justices balked at voiding the entire Florida Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986; the justices, therefore, found the reform statute's various and disparate rearrangements of both
tort law and insurance regulation a single subject. Id. at 189-191. Even granting that tougher
"one subject" scrutiny should be given to constitutional amendments than legislative bills, it
nevertheless makes little sense to label 1986's multifarious response to the insurance crisis
"one subject" and yet deny that same constitutional label to Amendment Nine's relatively
puny effort to remedy the rising costs and increasing unavailability of liability insurance.
The court, after having written opinions spreading fog all around the "one subject" rule,
opinions which befuddle even some of the justices, see Fine, 448 So. 2d at 996 (Ehrlich, J.
concurring in result), nevertheless in Evans grounded its anti-Amendment Nine result alternatively on section 101.161, Florida Statutes which requires constitutional amendments
placed on the ballot to be printed in plain language. Neither the Florida Constitution nor
state statutory law provides a mechanism whereby the attorney general or some other official preliminarily screens or redrafts citizens' proposed ballot amendments. Given the sad
state of the English language in most government circles, it hardly behooves Florida's justices to criticize the prose style of the laity.
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for a unicameral legislature. 5 5 Ervin warned of overly technical
judges crippling the people's initiative rights:
Because a proposal may be radical, chaotic or revolutionary in the
minds of some is no justification for its rejection ab initio as unconstitutional. After all, a great degree of confidence must necessarily be reposed in the good judgment of the people ... to weed
out the chaotic, the radical, and the revolutionary."'9

The Florida Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986

C.

The most extensive single package of reform measures coming
out of a state legislature in recent years is the series of tort law
changes contained in Florida's Tort Reform and Insurance Act of
1986.140 This act offers no radical substitutes for common law torts.
Florida's 1986 reform package is rather an accumulation and extension of a series of standard bandaid reforms aimed at shoring
up a leaking tort system. This major legislation was put into a single package because the rising costs of personal injury litigation
was a major factor contributing to the crisis in insurance. 4 1 The
single package approach may also have been necessary to assure
passage of a very controversial bill which saw both the insurance
industry and the trial bar give up as well as gain ground. 4 2
This reform package entered Florida law just as ATLA's Constitutional Challenge Committee cleared its decks for anti-reform action, a concurrence no doubt attributable to the passage in 1986 of
reform legislation by almost half the states. Florida's 1986 legislation outdid most other state reforms by including provisions both
freezing and conditionally rolling back liability insurance rates,
and increasing state regulatory power over the insurance industry. 4" Florida's act also altered the state's civil litigation process in
so many ways that the personal injury bar had a right to be angry,
not only because of damage to lawyer incomes, but because of the
138.

Adams v. Gunter, 238 So. 2d 824, 833 (Fla. 1970) (Ervin, C.J., dissenting).

139. Id. at 834.
The Act has been designated as Ch. 86-160, Laws of Fla., codified in §§ 768.71-.81
(Supp. 1986). By 1986, at least 34 states had passed some form of tort reform
legislation; however, in only nine of those states are the reforms approved deemed significant. See Tort Reform Explodes, BUSINESS INS., Aug. 18, 1986, at 1.
141. Smith v. Department of Ins., 12 Fla. L.W. 189, 190 (Fla. 1987). See also Fort, supra
note 8 at 533-44.
142. See generally Fort, supra note 8.
143. Radical Changes for Civil Litigation in Florida, FLA. B.J., Nov. 1986, at 25.
140.

FLA. STAT.
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tedious chore of keeping up with all the complicated legislative revision of common law torts."'
Florida's Tort Reform and Insurance Act altered common law
tort law as follows: it limited punitive damages to three times the
compensatory damages awarded, with sixty percent of any punitive
damage award to be paid into the state treasury;4 5 it reduced a
plaintiff's award by amounts available from certain collateral
sources; 14 6 it provided for future economic damages exceeding
$250,000 to be paid by periodic payments;14 7 it included a procedure whereby a plaintiff or defendant whose settlement offer is refused may recover costs and attorney's fees, should the final judgment vary no more than twenty-five percent from the settlement
offer; 4 8 it capped noneconomic damages at $450,000 per person;4 9
it abolished joint and several liability for noneconomic damages for
awards over $25,000;15 ° and it penalized a losing party or attorney
in cases where a complaint or defense is frivolous. 5 '
The Florida Tort Reform and Insurance Act of 1986 was challenged immediately by, among others, the Academy of Florida
Trial Lawyers. The Academy contended at trial that the tort reform provisions violate the Florida Constitution's equal protection,
due process, trial by jury, and open courts clauses, as well as the
state constitutional command that each legislative bill be limited
52
to a single subject.1
144. Since the early 1970's, chapter 768 of the Florida Statutes (the negligence chapter)
has been altered by a long series of reform measures. The 1986 Tort Reform Act is but a
continuation of the changing face of tort law in Florida and across the nation. Florida's 1986
legislation to some extent builds upon earlier statutory reforms in the medical malpractice
area, and widens the reach of these reforms to all personal injury litigation. See generally,

id.
145. Ch. 86-160, 1986 Fla. Laws 695 at § 52 (creating FLA. STAT. § 768.73).
146. Id. § 56 (creating FLA. STAT. § 768.76).
147. Id. § 57 (creating FLA. STAT. § 768.78).
148. Id. § 58 (creating FLA. STAT. § 768.79).
149. Id. § 59 (creating FLA. STAT. § 768.80). The Florida Supreme Court held the
$450,000 cap on non-economic damages to be unconstitutional in Smith v. Department of
Ins., 12 Fla. L.W. 189 (Fla. 1987). This case will not be final until rehearing possibilities are
extinguished. The court held that the provision violated the Florida Constitution's open
courts clause, art. I § 21 and, incidently, the trial by jury clause, art. I § 22.
150. Id. § 60 (creating FLA. STAT. § 768.81).
151. Id. § 61 (amending FLA. STAT. § 57.105).
152. Amer. Ins. Ass'n v. State, Case No. 86-2262 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 1986). The Leon
County Circuit Court upheld the constitutionality of all the Act's tort reform provisions.
The open courts clause of the Florida Constitution, FLA. CONST. art. I, § 21, has in recent
years been seized upon by opponents of tort reform as a convenient symbol for the notion
that traditional tort remedies are too precious to permit any legislative tinkering except of
the most minor sort.
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The Florida Supreme Court declared in Smith v. Department of
Insurance" that the major insurance company gain, the $450,000
cap on pain and suffering damages, violates the state constitution's
open courts clause. Although the court in Smith also ruled unconstitutional some minor premium rebate provisions disliked by the
insurance industry,'" insurance people probably feel they did
something foolish when they worked out a deal with one set of lawyers, knowing they had to go before another set of lawyers (judges)
with the power to turn the compromise on its ear.
The supreme court's reasoning in declaring the damages-cap
provision of the 1986 compromise unconstitutional was fragmented. Justices Ehrlich, Barkett, and Adkins voted to void the
entire Act. These three thought the package deal violated the single subject requirement for legislative bills. They, along with Justices Shaw and Kogan, joined to kill the cap on pain and suffering
damages. In addition to the court's per curiam opinion, three justices wrote separately by way of partial dissents. No more than
three justices joined in any particular theory of the case.
As with previous opinions applying the open courts clause to legislative tort reform, the court in Smith made no effort to grapple
with the tough economic and social problems raised by the crisis in
torts and insurance. The court seemed to finally recognize that
perhaps the legislature knows what it is talking about when it says
there is a crisis in both the availability and affordability of liability
insurance. 155 Nevertheless, the majority of the justices were content with a shallow analysis of the tort reform problem in terms of
playing definition games with the concept of open courts. One
question never successfully answered by the court is how, if a cap
on damages unconstitutionally closes the courthouse door, does the
Tort Reform Act's modification of joint and several liability and
other damage-reducing features escape the constitutional axe. 56
153. Smith, 12 Fla. L.W. 189.
154. Id. at 194-195.
155. Id. at 190-191.
156. The Smith court's weak rationale for finding the courts open to plaintiffs shut out
by the demise of joint and several liability is to fall back on the old causation ploy: "We find
no violation of the right of access to the court because that right does not include the right
to recover for injuries beyond those caused by the particular defendant." Id. at 193. This
apparently means plaintiffs before 1986 collected damages which defendants did not cause,
or else it means there is no right of access here because there is no right of access. For
further insights into the tricks of the causation doctrine see Vinson, Proximate Cause
Should be Barred from Wandering Outside Negligence Law, 13 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 215
(1985).
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The court in Smith found Kluger controlling with respect to the
cap on pain and suffering damages. Despite the legislature's long
preamble to its 1986 reform package detailing the severe ramifications of the insurance crisis, 57 the court could not find the "overpowering public necessity" which Kluger requires to sustain certain tort reforms.16 8 The court, moreover, could not find in the
Tort Reform Act the required "commensurate benefit" justifying a
limit on plaintiffs' recoveries. The court was unwilling to consider
the limited immunity from tort liability, which a damages cap provides for everyone, a "commensurate benefit" for injured plaintiffs.
The court reasoned that plaintiffs are unlikely to be negligent and
therefore unlikely to need tort immunity. 59 Nor did the idea that
all will benefit from a more stable insurance industry strike the
court as a "commensurate benefit."1 60
As in Kluger, the court made no independent investigation of
the depth and intensity of the crisis which led the 1986 legislature
to make tort reform the major focus of the session. Instead the
court was content with referring to damages caps that cannot meet
its Kluger tests as the product of "majoritarian whim."'' In sum,
the court did not purport to know anything about the crisis into
which it was willing to stumble, and the reader of Smith is not able
to tell from the court's words anything about why the court felt
compelled to intervene. Assuming that the Smith decision withstands any rehearing motions, the supreme court has given renewed notice that, despite a fragmented court, the trial bar still
has friends in high places. If the legislature wishes to reform tort
law in ways that will drastically affect lawyer income, it may take a
constitutional amendment.
V.

CONCLUSION

If it is the "good judgment of the people" which should in the
end control how government answers the compensation needs of
accident victims, then judges should allow legislators and voters a
157. Smith, 12 Fla. L.W. at 195.
158. Id. at 191-192. The court noted as well that no party to the litigation argued that an
"overpowering public necessity" prompted a damages cap. Id. at 192.
159. Id. at 191.
160. Id. at 192. See Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal.3d 137, 695 P.2d 665,
681-682 n.18, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985) appeal dismissed, 106 S.Ct. 214 (1985), for the California Supreme Court's recent willingness to consider stabilization of the medical malpractice insurance industry a decent trade-off for limiting noneconomic malpractice damages.
161. Smith, 12 Fla. L.W. at 192.
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freer hand to legislate new tort law, or, if the public sees fit, replace tort law with alternative compensation schemes. The courts
are a particularly inappropriate institution for sorting out the terribly complex factors that contribute to the tort crisis. So far, legislatures around the country have only begun to sort out the intricate mechanisms by which the insurance industry operates. If
legislatures have trouble gathering reliable data about our insurance system, it is unlikely that a court, with its institutional restraints on gathering information, will be in a position to confidently second-guess a legislature's judgment about a liability
insurance crisis and the appropriate government response.
Nor are courts well suited to gather empirical data about how
the tort system functions. Judges are limited in their ability to discover, for example: how many accident victims go uncompensated;
the percentage of awards attributable to intangible losses; the effect of caps on awards or on attorneys' fees; the effect of modifying
joint and several liability, or ending the collateral source rule;
whether and when strict products liability promotes safer products; and the percentage of the liability insurance dollar going for
attorneys' fees, insurance company overhead, expert witnesses, and
other costs of trial.
Furthermore, even were judges sitting on top of the best information available about litigation explosions and insurance practices, given the tenacity with which their legal brothers and sisters
of the bar are fighting tort reform, are these ex-lawyers-turned
judges in a position where they can fairly resolve matters which
mean so much financially to large and powerful segments of the
state bar? Current Florida Bar President and personal injury lawyer Joe Reiter in 1984 explained to the Florida Bar Board of Governors, and indirectly to the Florida Supreme Court, how important it is for the legal community to band together to preserve the
tort system from outside interference:
'I move we direct our staff and the president to take whatever
action is necessary [to defeat Amendment Nine] and spend
whatever money is necessary to fight this amendment-to put on
extra staff if necessary-because this is a crisis matter. It may not
affect corporate lawyers or probate lawyers right away, but it will
soon affect all of us. It should not be allowed to happen.'""2
162. Orrick, Legislative activism reflected in two Board votes, Fla. Bar News, August 1,
1984, at 1, col. 1.
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The Florida Legislature to date has failed to distinguish itself in
its tentative piecemeal approach to dealing with the tort crisis. But
awkwardness in dealing with the tort crisis is something the Florida Supreme Court shares with the Florida Legislature. The court
would do well to recognize that it has had its chance to devise a
workable tort system - and now its the legislature's turn.

